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Abstract
Secret sharing over the fast-fading MIMO wiretap channel is considered. A source and a destination
try to share secret information over a fast-fading MIMO channel in the presence of an eavesdropper who
also makes channel observations that are different from but correlated to those made by the destination. An
interactive, authenticated public channel with unlimited capacity is available to the source and destination
for the secret sharing process. This situation is a special case of the “channel model with wiretapper”
considered by Ahlswede and Csisza´r. An extension of their result to continuous channel alphabets is
employed to evaluate the key capacity of the fast-fading MIMO wiretap channel. The effects of spatial
dimensionality provided by the use of multiple antennas at the source, destination, and eavesdropper are
then investigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel considered in the seminal paper [1] is the first example that demonstrates the
possibility of secure communications at the physical layer. It is shown in [1] that a source can transmit
a message at a positive (secrecy) rate to a destination in such a way that an eavesdropper only gathers
information at a negligible rate, when the source-to-eavesdropper channel1 is a degraded version of
the source-to-destination channel. A similar result for the Gaussian wiretap channel is provided in [2].
The work in [3] further removes the degraded wiretap channel restriction showing that positive secrecy
capacity is possible if the destination channel is “more capable” (“less noisy” for a full extension of
the rate region in [1]) than the eavesdropper’s channel. Recently, there has been a flurry of interest in
extending these early results to more sophisticated channel models, including fading wiretap channels,
multi-input multi-output (MIMO) wiretap channels, multiple-access wiretap channels, broadcast wiretap
channels, relay wiretap channels, etc. We do not attempt to provide a comprehensive summary of all
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1The source-to-eavesdropper and source-to-destination channels will hereafter be referred to as eavesdropper and destination
channels, respectively.
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2recent developments, and highlight only results that are most relevant to the present work. We refer
interested readers to the introduction and reference list of [4] for a concise and extensive overview of
recent works.
When the destination and eavesdropper channels experience independent fading, the strict requirement
of having a more capable destination channel for positive secrecy capacity can be loosened. This is due to
the simple observation that the destination channel may be more capable than the eavesdropper’s channel
under some fading realizations, even if the destination is not more capable than the eavesdropper on
average. Hence, if the channel state information (CSI) of both the destination and eavesdropper channels
is available at the source, it is shown in [4], [5] that a positive secrecy capacity can be achieved by means
of appropriate power control at the source. The key idea is to opportunistically transmit only during those
fading realizations for which the destination channel is more capable [6]. For block-ergodic fading, it
is also shown in [5] (see also [7]) that a positive secrecy capacity can be achieved with a variable-rate
transmission scheme without any eavesdropper CSI available at the source.
When the source, destination, and eavesdropper have multiple antennas, the resulting channel is known
as a MIMO wiretap channel (see [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]), which may also have positive secrecy capacity.
Since the MIMO wiretap channel is not degraded, the characterization of its secrecy capacity is not
straightforward. For instance, the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel is characterized in [9]
as the saddle point of a minimax problem, while an alternative characterization based on a recent result for
multi-antenna broadcast channels is provided in [11]. Interestingly all characterizations point to the fact
that the capacity achieving scheme is one that transmits only in the directions in which the destination
channel is more capable than the eavesdropper’s channel. Obviously, this is only possible when the
destination and eavesdropper CSI is available at the source. It is shown in [9] that if the individual
channels from antennas to antennas suffer from independent Rayleigh fading, and the respective ratios of
the numbers of source and destination antennas to that of eavesdropper antennas are larger than certain
fixed values, then the secrecy capacity is positive with probability one when the numbers of source,
destination, and eavesdropper antennas become very large.
As discussed above, the availability of destination (and eavesdropper) CSI at the source is an
implicit requirement for positive secrecy capacity in the fading and MIMO wiretap channels. Thus,
an authenticated feedback channel is needed to send the CSI from the destination back to the source.
In [5], [7], this feedback channel is assumed to be public, and hence the destination CSI is also available
to the eavesdropper. In addition, it is assumed that the eavesdropper knows its own CSI. With the
availability of a feedback channel, if the objective of having the source send secret information to the
3destination is relaxed to distilling a secret key shared between the source and destination, it is shown
in [13] that a positive key rate is achievable when the destination and eavesdropper channels are two
conditionally independent (given the source input symbols) memoryless binary channels, even if the
destination channel is not more capable than the eavesdropper’s channel. This notion of secret sharing
is formalized in [14] based on the concept of common randomness between the source and destination.
Assuming the availability of an interactive, authenticated public channel with unlimited capacity between
the source and destination, [14] suggests two different system models, called the “source model with
wiretapper” (SW) and the “channel model with wiretapper” (CW). The CW model is the similar to
the (discrete memoryless) wiretap channel model that we have discussed before. The SW model differs
in that the random symbols observed at the source, destination, and eavesdropper are realizations of a
discrete memoryless source with multiple components. Both SW and CW models have been extended
to the case of secret sharing among multiple terminals, with the possibility of some terminals acting
as helpers [15], [16], [17]. Key capacities have been obtained for the two special cases in which the
eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the destination channel and in which the destination and
eavesdropper channels are conditionally independent [14], [13]. Similar results have been derived for
multi-terminal secret sharing [16], [17], with the two special cases above subsumed by the more general
condition that the terminal symbols form a Markov chain on a tree. Authentication of the public channel
can be achieved by the use of an initial short key and then a small portion of the subsequent shared
secret message [18]. A detailed study of secret sharing over an unauthenticated public channel is given
in [19], [20], [21].
Other approaches to employ feedback have also been recently considered [22], [24], [23]. In particular,
it is shown in [22] that positive secrecy capacity can be achieved for the modulo-additive discrete
memoryless wiretap channel and the modulo-Λ channel if the destination is allowed to send signals
back to the source over the same wiretap channel and both terminals can operate in full-duplex manner.
In fact, for the former channel, the secrecy capacity is the same as the capacity of such a channel in the
absence of the eavesdropper.
In this paper, we consider secret sharing over a fast-fading MIMO wiretap channel. Thus, we
are interested in the CW model of [14] with memoryless conditionally independent destination and
eavesdropper channels and continuous channel alphabets. We provide an extension of the key capacity
result in [14] for this case to include continuous channel alphabets (Theorem 2.1). Using this result, we
obtain the key capacity of the fast-fading MIMO wiretap channel (Section III). Our result indicates that
the key capacity is always positive, no matter how large the channel gain of the eavesdropper’s channel
4is; in addition this holds even if the destination and eavesdropper CSI is available at the destination and
eavesdropper, respectively. Of course, the availability of the public channel implies that the destination
CSI could be fed back to the source. However, due to the restrictions imposed on the secret-sharing
strategies (see Section II), only causal feedback is allowed, and thus any destination CSI available at
source is “outdated”. This does not turn out to be a problem since, unlike the approaches mentioned above,
the source does not use the CSI to avoid sending secret information when the destination is not more
capable than the eavesdropper’s channel. As a matter of fact, the fading process of the destination channel
provides a significant part of the common randomness from which the source and the destination distill a
secret key. This fact is readily obtained from the alternative achievability proof given in Section IV. We
note that [25], [26] consider the problem key generation from common randomness over wiretap channels
and exploit a Wyner-Ziv coding scheme to limit the amount of information conveyed from the source to
the destination via the wiretap channel. Unlike these previous works, we only employ Wyner-Ziv coding
to quantize the destination channel outputs. Our code construction still relies on a public channel with
unlimited capacity to achieve the key capacity.
Finally, we also investigate the limiting value of the key capacity under three asymptotic scenarios. In
the first scenario, the transmission power of the source becomes asymptotically high (Corollary 3.1). In
the second scenario, the destination and eavesdropper have a large number of antennas (Corollary 3.2).
In the third scenario, the gain advantage of the eavesdropper’s channel becomes asymptotically large
(Corollary 3.3). These three scenarios reveal two different effects of spatial dimensionality upon key
capacity. In the first scenario, we show that the key capacity levels off as the power increases if the
eavesdropper has no fewer antennas than the source. On the other hand, when the source has more
antennas, the key capacity can increase without bound with the source power. In the second scenario, we
show that the spatial dimensionality advantage that the eavesdropper has over the destination has exactly
the same effect as the channel gain advantage of the eavesdropper. In the third scenario, we show that
the limiting key capacity is positive only if the eavesdropper has fewer antennas than the source. The
results in these scenarios confirm that spatial dimensionality can be used to combat the eavesdropper’s
gain advantage, which was already observed for the MIMO wiretap channel. Perhaps more surprisingly,
this is achieved with neither the source nor destination needing any eavesdropper CSI.
II. SECRET SHARING AND KEY CAPACITY
We consider the CW model of [14], and we recall its characteristics for completeness. We consider
three terminals, namely a source, a destination, and an eavesdropper. The source sends symbols from
5an alphabet X . The destination and eavesdropper observe symbols belonging to alphabets Y and Z ,
respectively. Unlike in [14], X , Y , and Z need not be discrete. In fact, in Section III we will assume
they are multi-dimensional vector spaces over the complex field. The channel from the source to the
destination and eavesdropper is assumed memoryless. A generic symbol sent by the source is denoted by
X and the corresponding symbols observed by the destination and eavesdropper are denoted by Y and
Z, respectively. For notational convenience (and without loss of generality), we assume that (X,Y, Z)
are jointly continuous, and the channel is specified by the conditional probability density function
(pdf) pY,Z|X(y, z|x). In addition, we restrict ourselves to cases in which Y and Z are conditionally
independent given X , i.e., pY,Z|X(y, z|x) = pY |X(y|x)pZ|X(z|x), which is a reasonable model for
symbols broadcasted in a wireless medium. Hereafter, we drop the subscripts in pdfs whenever the
concerned symbols are well specified by the arguments of the pdfs. We assume that an interactive,
authenticated public channel with unlimited capacity is also available for communicatin between the
source and destination. Here, interactive means that the channel is two-way and can be used multiple
times, unlimited capacity means that it is noiseless and has infinite capacity, and public and authenticated
mean that the eavesdropper can perfectly observe all communications over this channel but cannot tamper
with the messages transmitted.
We consider the class of permissible secret-sharing strategies suggested in [14]. Consider k time instants
labeled by 1, 2, . . . , k, respectively. The (X,Y, Z) channel is used n times during these k time instants
at i1 < i2 < · · · < in. Set in+1 = k. The public channel is used for the other (k − n) time instants.
Before the secret-sharing process starts, the source and destination generate, respectively, independent
random variable MX and MY . To simplify the notation, let ai represent a sequence of messages/symbols
a1, a2, . . . , ai. Then a permissible strategy proceeds as follows:
• At time instant 0 < i < i1, the source sends message Φi = Φi(MX ,Ψi−1) to the destination, and
the destination sends message Ψi = Ψi(MY ,Φi−1) to the source. Both transmissions are carried
over the public channel.
• At time instant i = ij for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, the source sends the symbol Xj = Xj(MX ,Ψij−1) to
the (X,Y, Z) channel. The destination and eavesdropper observe the corresponding symbols Yj and
Zj . There is no message exchange via the public channel, i.e., Φi and Ψi are both null.
• At time instant ij < i < ij+1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, the source sends message Φi = Φi(MX ,Ψi−1)
to the destination, and the destination sends message Ψi = Ψi(MY , Y j ,Φi−1) to the source. Both
transmissions are carried over the public channel.
6At the end of the k time instants, the source generates its secret key K = K(MX ,Ψk), and the destination
generates its secret key L = L(MY , Y n,Φk), where K and L takes values from the same finite set K.
According to [14], R is an achievable key rate through the channel (X,Y, Z) if for every ε > 0, there
exists a permissible secret-sharing strategy of the form described above such that
1) Pr{K 6= L} < ε,
2) 1nI(K;Z
n,Φk,Ψk) < ε,
3) 1nH(K) > R− ε, and
4) 1n log |K| < 1nH(K) + ε,
for sufficiently large n. The key capacity of the channel (X,Y, Z) is the largest achievable key rate
through the channel. We are interested in finding the key capacity. For the case of continuous channel
alphabets considered here, we also add the following power constraint to the symbol sequence Xn sent
out by the source:
1
n
n∑
j=1
|Xj |2 ≤ P (1)
with probability one (w.p.1) for sufficiently large n.
Theorem 2.1: The key capacity of a CW model (X,Y, Z) with conditional pdf p(y, z|x) =
p(y|x)p(z|x) is given by maxX:E[|X|2]≤P [I(X;Y )− I(Y ;Z)].
Proof: The case with discrete channel alphabets is established in [14, Corollary 2 of Theorem 2],
whose achievability proof (also the ones in [16], [17]) does not readily extend to continuous channel
alphabets. Nevertheless the same single backward message strategy suggested in [14] is still applicable
for continuous alphabets. That strategy uses k = n+1 time instants with ij = j for j = 1, 2, . . . , n. That
is the source first sends n symbols through the (X,Y, Z) channel; after receiving these n symbols, the
destination feeds back a single message at the last time instant to the source over the public channel. A
carefully structured Wyner-Ziv code can be employed to support this secret-sharing strategy. The detailed
arguments are provided in the alternative achievability proof in Section IV.
Here we outline an achievability argument based on the consideration of a conceptual wiretap channel
from the destination back to the source and eavesdropper suggested in [13, Theorem 3]. First, assume
the source sends a sequence of i.i.d. symbols Xn, each distributed according to p(x), over the wiretap
channel. Suppose that E[|X|2] ≤ P . Because of the law of large numbers, we can assume that Xn
satisfies the power constraint (1) without loss of generality. Let Y n and Zn be the observations of the
the destinations and eavesdropper, respectively. To transmit a sequence Un of symbols independent of
(Xn, Y n, Zn), the destination sends Un + Y n back to the source via the public channel. This creates a
7conceptual memoryless wiretap channel from the destination with input symbol U to the source in the
presence of the eavesdropper, where the source observes (U + Y,X) while the eavesdropper observes
(U + Y, Z).
Employing the continuous alphabet extension of the well known result in [3], the secrecy capacity of
the conceptual wiretap channel (and hence the key capacity of the original channel) is lower bounded by
max
U
[I(U ;U + Y,X)− I(U ;U + Y, Z)].
Note that the input symbol U has no power constraint since the public channel has infinite capacity. But
I(U ;U + Y,X)− I(U ;U + Y,Z)
= I(U ;X) + I(U ;U + Y |X)− [I(U ;Z) + I(U ;U + Y |Z)]
= h(U)− h(U |X) + h(U + Y |X)− h(U + Y |U,X)− h(U) + h(U |Z)− h(U + Y |Z) + h(U + Y |U,Z)
= h(Y |Z)− h(Y |X) + [h(U + Y |X)− h(U |X)]− [h(U + Y |Z)− h(U |Z)]
≥ h(Y |Z)− h(Y |X)− [h(U + Y |X)− h(U |X)]
≥ h(Y |Z)− h(Y |X)− [h(U + Y )− h(U)] (2)
where the equality on the fourth line results from h(U + Y |U,X) = h(Y |U,X) = h(Y |X) due to the
independence of U and Y , the inequality on the fifth line follows from the fact
h(U + Y |Z)− h(U |Z) ≥ h(U + Y |Z, Y )− h(U |Z) = h(U |Z, Y )− h(U |Z) = 0,
which is again due to independence between (Y,Z) and U , and the inequality on the last line follows
from h(U + Y |X)− h(U |X) = h(U + Y |X)− h(U) ≤ h(U + Y )− h(U).
Without loss of generality and for notational simplicity, assume that Y and U are both one-dimensional
real random variables. Now, choose U to be Gaussian distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2U . Then
h(U + Y )− h(U) ≤ 1
2
log (2pievar(U + Y ))− 1
2
log(2pieσ2U )
=
1
2
log
(
σ2U + var(Y )
σ2U
)
(3)
where the first inequality follows from [27, Theorem 8.6.5] and the last equality is due to the independence
between Y and U . Combining (2) and (3), for every ε > 0, we can choose σ2U large enough such that
I(U ;U + Y,X)− I(U ;U + Y,Z) ≥ h(Y |Z)− h(Y |X)− ε = I(X;Y )− I(Y ;Z)− ε.
Since ε is arbitrary, the key capacity is lower bounded by maxE[|X|2]≤P [I(X;Y )− I(Y ;Z)].
8The converse proof in [14] is directly applicable to continuous channel alphabets, provided the average
power constraint (1) can be incorporated into the arguments in [14, pp. 1129–1130]. This latter requirement
is simplified by the additive and symmetric nature of the average power constraint [28, Section 3.6]. To
avoid too much repetition, we outline below only the steps of the proof that are not directly available in
[14, pp. 1129–1130].
For every permissible strategy with achievable key rate R, we have
1
n
I(K;L) =
1
n
H(K)− 1
n
H(K|L)
≥ 1
n
H(K)− 1
n
[1 + Pr{K 6= L} · log |K|]
>
1
n
H(K)− 1
n
− ε
[
1
n
H(K) + ε
]
> (1− ε)(R− ε)− 1
n
− ε2 (4)
where the second line follows from Fano’s inequality, the third line results from conditions 1) and 4) in
the definition of achievable key rate, and the last line is due to condition 3). Thus it suffices to upper
bound I(K;L). From condition 2) in the definition of achievable key rate and the chain rule, we have
1
n
I(K;L) <
1
n
I(K;L|Zn,Φk,Ψk) + ε
≤ 1
n
I(MX ;MY , Y n|Zn,Φk,Ψk) + ε (5)
where the second inequality is due to the fact that K = K(MX ,Ψk) and L = L(MY , Y n,Φk). By
repeated uses of the chain rule, the construction of permissible strategies, and the memoryless nature of
the (X,Y, Z) channel, it is shown in [14, pp. 1129–1130] that
1
n
I(MX ;MY , Y n|Zn,Φk,Ψk) ≤ 1
n
n∑
j=1
I(Xj ;Yj |Zj). (6)
Now let Q be a uniform random variable that takes value from {1, 2, . . . , n}, and is independent
of all other random quantities. Define (X˜, Y˜ , Z˜) = (Xj , Yj , Zj) if Q = j. Then it is obvious that
pY˜ ,Z˜|X˜(y˜, z˜|x˜) = pY,Z|X(y˜, z˜|x˜), and (6) can be rewritten as
1
n
I(MX ;MY , Y n|Zn,Φk,Ψk) ≤ I(X˜; Y˜ |Z˜, Q) ≤ I(X˜; Y˜ |Z˜) (7)
where the second inequality is due to the fact that Q → X˜ → (Y˜ , Z˜) forms a Markov chain. On the
other hand, the power constraint (1) implies that
E[|X˜|2] = 1
n
n∑
j=1
E[|Xj |2] ≤ P. (8)
9Combining (4), (5), and (7), we obtain
R <
1
1− ε
[
I(X˜; Y˜ |Z˜) + 2ε+ 1
n
]
. (9)
Since ε can be arbitrarily small when n is sufficiently large, (9), together with (8), gives
R ≤ I(X˜; Y˜ |Z˜)
≤ max
X:E[|X|2]≤P
I(X;Y |Z)
= max
X:E[|X|2]≤P
[I(X;Y )− I(Y ;Z)]
where the last line is due to the fact that p(y, z|x) = p(y|x)p(z|x).
III. KEY CAPACITY OF FAST FADING MIMO WIRETAP CHANNEL
Consider that the source, destination, and eavesdropper have mS , mD, and mW antennas, respectively.
The antennas in each node are separated by at least a few wavelengths, and hence the fading processes
of the channels across the transmit and receive antennas are independent. Using the complex baseband
representation of the bandpass channel model:
YD = HDX +ND
YW = αHWX +NW (10)
where
• X is the mS × 1 complex-valued transmit symbol vector by the source,
• YD is the mD × 1 complex-valued receive symbol vector at the destination,
• YW is the mW × 1 complex-valued receive symbol vector at the eavesdropper,
• ND is the mD × 1 noise vector with independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean, circular-
symmetric complex Gaussian-distributed elements of variance σ2D (i.e., the real and imaginary parts
of each elements are independent zero-mean Gaussian random variables with the same variance),
• NW is the mW × 1 noise vector with i.i.d. zero-mean, circular-symmetric complex Gaussian-
distributed elements of variance σ2W ,
• HD is the mD ×mS channel matrix from the source to destination with i.i.d. zero-mean, circular-
symmetric complex Gaussian-distributed elements of unit variance,
• HW is the mW ×mS channel matrix from the source to eavesdropper with i.i.d. zero-mean, circular-
symmetric complex Gaussian-distributed elements of unit variance
• α > 0 models the gain advantage of the eavesdropper over the destination.
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Note that HD, HW , ND, and NW are independent. The wireless channel modeled by (10) is used n times
as the (X,Y, Z) channel described in Section II with Y = [YD HD] and Z = [YW HW ]. We assume that
the n uses of the wireless channel in (10) are i.i.d. so that the memoryless requirement of the (X,Y, Z)
channel is satisfied. Since HD and HW are included in the respective channel symbols observable by
the destination and eavesdropper (i.e., Y and Z respectively), this model also implicitly assumes that the
destination and eavesdropper have perfect CSI of their respective channels from the source. In practice,
we can separate adjacent uses of the wireless channel by more than the coherence time of the channel
to approximately ensure the i.i.d. channel use assumption. Training (known) symbols can be sent right
before or after (within the channel coherence period) by the source so that the destination can acquire
the required CSI. The eavesdropper may also use these training symbols to acquire the CSI of its own
channel. If the CSI required at the destination is obtained in the way just described, then a unit of channel
use includes the symbol X together with the associated training symbols. However, as in [29], we do not
count the power required to send the training symbols (cf. Eq. (1)). Moreover we note that the source
(and also the eavesdropper) may get some information about the outdated CSI of the destination channel,
because information about the destination channel CSI, up to the previous use, may be fed back to the
source from the destination via the public channel. More specifically, at time instant ij , the source symbol
Xj is a function of the feedback message Ψij−1, which is in turn some function of the realizations of
HD at time i1, i2, . . . , ij−1. We also note that neither the source nor destination has any eavesdropper
CSI. Referring back to (10), these two facts imply that X is independent of HD, HW , ND, and NW ,
i.e., the current source symbol X is independent of the current channel state.
Since the fading MIMO wiretap channel model in (10) is a special case of the CW model considered
in Section II, the key capacity CK is given by Theorem 2.1 as:
CK = max
X:E[|X|2]≤P
[I(X;YD, HD)− I(YD, HD;YW , HW )]. (11)
Note that
I(X;YD, HD)− I(YD, HD;YW , HW ) = I(X;YD|HD)− I(YD;YW |HD, HW )
= h(YD|YW , HD, HW )− h(YD|X,HD)
= h(YD|YW , HD, HW )−mD log(pieσ2D). (12)
Substituting this back into (11), we get
CK = max
X:E[|X|2]≤P
h(YD|YW , HD, HW )−mD log(pieσ2D). (13)
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As a result, the key capacity of the fast-fading wiretap channel described by (10) can be obtained by
maximizing the conditional entropy h(YD|YW , HD, HW ). This maximization problem is solved below:
Theorem 3.1:
CK = E
log det
(
ImS +
α2P
mSσ2W
H†WHW +
P
mSσ2D
H†DHD
)
det
(
ImS +
α2P
mSσ2W
H†WHW
)
 .
where † denotes conjugate transpose.
Proof: To determine the key capacity, we need the following upper bound on the conditional entropy
h(U |V )
Lemma 3.1: Let U and V be two jointly distributed complex random vectors of dimensions mU and
mV , respectively. Let KU , KV , and KUV be the covariance of U , covariance of V , and cross-covariance
of U and V , respectively. If KV is invertible, then
h(U |V ) ≤ log det(KU −KUVK−1V KV U ) +mU log(pie).
The upper bound is achieved when [UT V T ]T is a circular-symmetric complex Gaussian random vector.
Proof: We can assume that both U and V have zero means without loss of generality. Also assume
that the existence of all unconditional and conditional covariances stated below. For each v,
h(U |V = v) ≤ log ((pie)mU det(KU |v)) (14)
where KU |v is the covariance of U with respect to the conditional density pU |V (u|v) [29, Lemma 2].
This implies
h(U |V ) ≤ EV
[
log
(
(pie)mU det(KU |V )
)]
≤ log det(EV [KU |V ]) +mU log(pie)
≤ log det(KU −KUVK−1V KV U ) +mU log(pie). (15)
The second inequality above is due to the concavity of the function log det over the set of positive
definite symmetric matrices [30, 7.6.7] and the Jensen’s inequality. To get the third inequality, observe that
EV [KU |V ] can be interpreted as the covariance of the estimation error of estimating U by the conditional
mean estimator E[U |V ]. On the other hand, KU − KUVK−1V KV U is the covariance of the estimation
error of using the linear minimum mean squared error estimator KUVK−1V V instead. The inequality
results from the fact that KU −KUVK−1V KV U ≥ EV [KU |V ] (i.e., [KU −KUVK−1V KV U ] − EV [KU |V ]
is positive semidefinite) [31] and the inequality of det(A) ≥ det(B) if A and B are positive definite,
and A ≥ B [30, 7.7.4].
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Suppose that [UT V T ]T is a circular-symmetric complex Gaussian random vector. For each v, the
conditional covariance of U , conditioned on V = v, is the same as the (unconditional) covariance of
U −KUVK−1V V . Since U −KUVK−1V V is a circular-symmetric complex Gaussian random vector [29,
Lemma 3], so is U conditioned on V = v. Hence by [29, Lemma 2], the upper bound in (14) is achieved
with KU |v = KU −KUVK−1V KV U , which also gives the upper bound in (15).
To prove the theorem, we first obtain an upper bound on CK and then show that the upper bound is
achievable. Using Lemma 3.1, we have
h(YD|YW , HD, HW )−mD log(pieσ2D) ≤ E
[
log det
(
KYD −KYDYWK−1YWKYWYD
)]−mD log σ2D (16)
where KYD and KYW are respectively the conditional covariances of YD and YW , given HD and HW ,
and KYDYW and KYWYD are the corresponding conditional cross-covariances. Substituting (16) into (13),
an upper bound on CK is
max
X:E[|X|2]≤P
E
[
log det
(
KYD −KYDYWK−1YWKYWYD
)]−mD log σ2D. (17)
Thus we need to solve the maximization problem (17). To do so, let λ1, λ2, . . . , λmS be the (nonnegative)
eigenvalues of KX . Since both the distributions of HD and HW are invariant to any unitary transformation
[29, Lemma 5], we can without any ambiguity define
f(λ1, λ2, . . . , λmS)
= E
[
log det
(
ImD +
1
σ2D
HDK
1/2
X
(
ImS +
α2
σ2W
K
1/2
X H
†
WHWK
1/2
X
)−1
K
1/2
X H
†
D
)]
. (18)
That is, we can assume KX = diag(λ1, λ2, . . . , λmS) with no loss of generality. Then we have the
following lemma, which suggests that the objective function in (17) is a concave function depending
only on the eigenvalues of the covariance of X:
Lemma 3.2: Suppose that X has an arbitrary covariance KX , whose (nonnegative) eigenvalues are
λ1, λ2, . . . , λmS . Then
E
[
log det
(
KYD −KYDYWK−1YWKYWYD
)]−mD log σ2D = f(λ1, λ2, . . . , λmS) (19)
is concave in Λ = {λi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,mS}.
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Proof: First write AD = HDK
1/2
X and AW = αHWK
1/2
X . It is easy to see from (10) that KYD =
ADA
†
D + σ
2
DImD , KYW = AWA
†
W + σ
2
W ImW , and KYDYW = ADA
†
W . Then
KYD −KYDYWK−1YWKYWYD
= σ2D
{
ImD +
1
σ2D
AD
[
ImS −A†W
(
AWA
†
W + σ
2
W ImW
)−1
AW
]
A†D
}
= σ2D
{
ImD +
1
σ2D
AD
[
ImS +
1
σ2W
A†WAW
]−1
A†D
}
(20)
where the last equality is due to the matrix inversion formula. Substituting this result into the left hand
side of (19), we obtain the right hand side of (18), and hence (19).
To show concavity of f , it suffices to consider only diagonal KX = diag(λ1, λ2, . . . , λmS) in
Λ. Note that the mapping H : KX →
 KYD KYDYW
KYWYD KYW
 is linear in Λ. Also the mapping
F :
 KYD KYDYW
KYWYD KYW
 → KYD − KYDYWK−1YWKYWYD is matrix-concave in H(Λ) [32, Ex. 3.58].
Thus the composition theorem [32] gives that the mapping G : KX → KYD − KYDYWK−1YWKYWYD is
matrix-concave in Λ, since G = F ◦H . Another use of the composite theorem together with the concavity
of the function log det as mentioned in the proof of Lemma 3.1 shows that log detG is concave in Λ.
Thus (19) implies that f is also concave in Λ.
Hence it suffices to consider only those X with zero mean in (17).
Now define the constraint set ΛP = {λi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,mS and
∑mS
i=1 λi ≤ P}. Lemma 3.2
implies that we can find the upper bound on CK by calculating maxΛP f(λ1, λ2, . . . , λmS), whose value
is given by the next lemma:
Lemma 3.3: max
ΛP
f(λ1, λ2, . . . , λmS) = f
(
P
mS
,
P
mS
, . . . ,
P
mS
)
.
Proof: Since the elements of both HD and HW are i.i.d., f is invariant to any permutation of
its arguments. This means that f is a symmetric function. By Lemma 3.2, f is also concave in ΛP .
Thus it is Schur-concave [33]. Hence a Schur-minimal element (an element majorized by any another
element) in ΛP maximizes f . It is easy to check that
(
P
mS
, PmS , . . . ,
P
mS
)
is Schur-minimal in ΛP . Hence
maxΛP f(λ1, λ2, . . . , λmS) = f
(
P
mS
, PmS , . . . ,
P
mS
)
.
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Combining the results in (17), (18), Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3, we obtain the upper bound on the key
capacity as
CK ≤ E
[
log det
(
ImD +
P
mSσ2D
HD
(
ImS +
α2P
mSσ2W
H†WHW
)−1
H†D
)]
= E
log det
(
ImS +
α2P
mSσ2W
H†WHW +
P
mSσ2D
H†DHD
)
det
(
ImS +
α2P
mSσ2W
H†WHW
)
 (21)
where the identity det(I+UV −1U †) = det(V+U
†U)
det(V ) for invertible V [34, Theorem 18.1.1] has been used.
On the other hand, consider choosing X to have i.i.d. zero-mean, circular-symmetric complex Gaussian-
distributed elements of variance PmS . Then conditioned on HD and HW , [Y
T
D Y
T
W ]
T are a circular-
symmetric complex Gaussian random vector, by applying [29, Lemmas 3 and 4] to the linear model
of (10). Hence Lemma 3.1 gives
h(YD|YW , HD, HW ) = E
[
log det
(
KYD −KYDYWK−1YWKYWYD
)]
+mD log(pie)
where KYD =
P
mS
HDH
†
D + σ
2
DImD , KYW =
α2P
mS
HWH
†
W + σ
2
W ImW , and KYDYW =
αP
mS
HDH
†
W .
Substituting this back into (12) and using the matrix inversion formula to simplify the resulting expression,
we obtain the same expression on the first line of (21) for I(X;YD, HD)− I(YD, HD;YW , HW ). Thus
the upper bound in (21) is achievable with this choice of X; hence it is in fact the key capacity.
In Fig. 1, the key capacities of several fast-fading MIMO channels with different number of source,
destination, and eavesdropper antennas are plotted against the source signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) P/σ2
where σ2D = σ
2
W = σ
2. The channel gain advantage of the eavesdropper is set to α2 = 1. We observe
that the key capacity levels off as P/σ2 increases in three of the four channels, except the case of
(mS ,mD,mW ) = (2, 1, 1), considered in Fig. 1. It appears that the relative antenna dimensions determine
the asymptotic behavior of the key capacity when the SNR is large. To more precisely study this behavior,
we evaluate the limiting value of CK as the input power P of the source becomes very large. To highlight
the dependence of CK on P , we use the notation CK(P ).
Corollary 3.1: 1) If mW ≥ mS , then
lim
P→∞
CK(P ) = E
log det
(
H†WHW +
σ2W
α2σ2D
H†DHD
)
det
(
H†WHW
)
 .
2) Suppose that mW < mS . Define
C∞(P ) = E
[
log det
(
ImD +
P
mSσ2D
HD
[
ImS −H†W
(
HWH
†
W
)−1
HW
]
H†D
)]
.
Then limP→∞
CK(P )
C∞(P )
= 1.
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Fig. 1. Key capacities of fast-fading MIMO wiretap channels with different numbers of source, destination, eavesdropper
antennas. The eavesdropper’s channel gain α2 = 0dB, and σ2D = σ
2
W = σ
2.
Proof: First fix (λ1, λ2, . . . , λmS) =
(
P
mS
, PmS , . . . ,
P
mS
)
or equivalently KX = Pms ImS , and consider
the mapping G defined in the proof of Lemma 3.2 as a function of P . Also define
fˆ(P ) = log det
(
ImD +
P
mSσ2D
HD
(
ImS +
α2P
mSσ2W
H†WHW
)−1
H†D
)
.
Thus CK(P ) = E[fˆ(P )]. It is not hard to check that for any P < P˜ , G(P˜ ) ≥ G(P ), which implies that
det(G(P )) ≥ det(G(P˜ )). Hence fˆ is increasing in P . Since the elements of HW are continuously i.i.d.,
rank(H†WHW ) = rank(HWH
†
W ) = rank(HW ) = min(mS ,mW ) w.p.1. Thus the matrix H
†
WHW (resp.
HWH
†
W ) is invertible w.p.1 when mW ≥ mS (resp. mW < mS).
Now, consider the case of mW ≥ mS . As in (21), we have
fˆ(P ) = log
det
(
mSσ2W
α2P ImS +H
†
WHW +
σ2W
α2σ2D
H†DHD
)
det
(
mSσ2W
α2P ImS +H
†
WHW
) .
Since H†WHW is invertible w.p.1,
lim
P→∞
fˆ(P ) = log
det
(
H†WHW +
σ2W
α2σ2D
H†DHD
)
det
(
H†WHW
) w.p.1.
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Hence Part 1) of the lemma results from monotone convergence.
For the case of mW < mS , the matrix inversion formula allows us to instead write
fˆ(P ) = log det
(
ImD +
P
mSσ2D
HD
[
ImS −H†W
(
mSσ
2
W
α2P
ImW +HWH
†
W
)−1
HW
]
H†D
)
Since HWH
†
W is invertible w.p.1, we can also define
fˆ∞(P ) = log det
(
ImD +
P
mSσ2D
HD
[
ImS −H†W
(
HWH
†
W
)−1
HW
]
H†D
)
.
Note that C∞(P ) = E[fˆ∞(P )]. Since HW is of rank mW w.p.1, it has the singular value decomposition
HW = UW [SW 0mS−mW ]V
†
W , where SW = diag(s1, s2, . . . , smW ) is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal
elements are the positive singular values of HW . Also let V = [V˜ Vˆ ], i.e., V˜W and VˆW consist respectively
of the first mW and the last mS −mW columns of V . Employing the unitary property of UW and VW ,
it is not hard to verify that
fˆ(P ) = log det
(
ImD +
P
mSσ2D
HDVˆW Vˆ
†
WH
†
D +HDV˜WΛW (P )V˜
†
WH
†
D
)
(22)
fˆ∞(P ) = log det
(
ImD +
P
mSσ2D
HDVˆW Vˆ
†
WH
†
D
)
(23)
where ΛW (P ) =
σ2W
α2σ2D
(
mSσ2W
α2P ImW + S
2
W
)−1
. From (22) and (23), it is clear that fˆ∞(P ) ≤ fˆ(P ).
Further let t(P ) = tr
(
HDV˜WΛW (P )V˜
†
WH
†
D
)
. Since t(P )ImD ≥ HDV˜WΛW (P )V˜ †WH†D,
fˆ(P ) ≤ log det
(
[1 + t(P )]ImD +
P
mSσ2D
HDVˆW Vˆ
†
WH
†
D
)
= mD log(1 + t(P )) + log det
(
ImD +
P
mSσ2D[1 + t(P )]
HDVˆW Vˆ
†
WH
†
D
)
. (24)
Let µ1, µ2, . . . , µj be the positive eigenvalues of HDVˆW Vˆ
†
WH
†
D. Note that 1 ≤ j ≤ min(mD,mS−mW ),
because of the fact that the elements of HD are continuously i.i.d. and are independent of the elements
of HW . Hence, from (23), (24) and the fact that fˆ∞(P ) ≤ fˆ(P ), we have
0 ≤ fˆ(P )− fˆ∞(P ) ≤ mD log(1 + t(P )) + log
∏ji=1
[
1 + PµimSσ2D(1+t(P ))
]
∏j
i=1
[
1 + PµimSσ2D
]

= mD log(1 + t(P )) +
j∑
i=1
log
 11+t(P ) + mSσ2DPµi
1 + mSσ
2
D
Pµi
 . (25)
Now note that
lim
P→∞
t(P ) =
σ2W
α2σ2D
tr
(
HDV˜WS
−2
W V˜
†
WH
†
D
)
=
σ2W
α2σ2D
tr
(
[H−1W H
†
D]
†H−1W H
†
D
)
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where H−1W denotes the Penrose-Moore pseudo-inverse of HW . Then (25) implies that
0 ≤ lim inf
P→∞
[fˆ(P )− fˆ∞(P )]
≤ lim sup
P→∞
[fˆ(P )− fˆ∞(P )]
≤ (mD − j) log
(
1 +
σ2W
α2σ2D
tr
(
[H−1W H
†
D]
†H−1W H
†
D
))
w.p.1.
Hence by Fatou’s lemma, we get
0 ≤ lim inf
P→∞
[CK(P )− C∞(P )]
≤ lim sup
P→∞
[CK(P )− C∞(P )]
≤ E
[
(mD − j) log
(
1 +
σ2W
α2σ2D
tr
(
[H−1W H
†
D]
†H−1W H
†
D
))]
. (26)
From (23), it is clear that fˆ∞(P ) increases without bound in P w.p.1; hence C∞(P ) also increases
without bound. Combining this fact with (26), we arrive at the conclusion of Part 2) of the lemma.
Part 1) of the lemma verifies the observations shown in Fig. 1 that the key capacity levels off as the
SNR increases if the number of source antennas is no larger than that of eavesdropper antennas. When
the source has more antennas, Part 2) of the lemma suggests that the key capacity can grow without
bound as P increases similarly to a MIMO fading channel with capacity C∞(P ). Note that the matrix
ImS−H†W
(
HWH
†
W
)−1
HW in the expression that defines C∞(P ) is a projection matrix to the orthogonal
complement of the column space of HW . Thus C∞(P ) has the physical interpretation that the secret
information is passed across the dimensions not observable by the eavesdropper. The most interesting
aspect is that this mode of operation can be achieved even if neither the source nor the destination knows
the channel matrix HW .
We note that the asymptotic behavior of the key capacity in the high SNR regime summarized in
Corollary 3.1 is similar to the idea of secrecy degree of freedom introduced in [35]. The subtle difference
here is that no up-to-date CSI of the destination channel is needed at the source.
Another interesting observation from Fig. 1 is that for the case of (mS ,mD,mW ) = (1, 10, 10), the
source power P seems to have little effect on the key capacity. A small amount of source power is enough
to get close to the leveling key capacity of about 1 bit per channel use. This observation is generalized
below by Corollary 3.2, which characterizes the effect of spatial dimensionality of the destination and
eavesdropper on the key capacity when the destination and eavesdropper both have a large number of
antennas.
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Fig. 2. Key capacities of fast-fading MIMO wiretap channels with different numbers of source, destination, eavesdropper
antennas. The source signal to noise ratio P/σ2 = 10dB, where σ2D = σ
2
W = σ
2.
Corollary 3.2: When mD and mW approaches infinity in such a way that lim
mD,mW→∞
mW
mD
= β,
CK → mS log
(
1 +
1
βα2σ2D/σ
2
W
)
.
Proof: This corollary is a direct consequence of the fact that 1mDH
†
DHD → ImS and 1mWH
†
WHW →
ImS w.p.1, which is in turn due to the strong law of large numbers.
Note that we can interpret the ratio β as the spatial dimensionality advantage of the eavesdropper over
the destination. The expression for the limiting CK in the corollary clearly indicates that this spatial
dimensionality advantage affects the key capacity in the same way as the channel gain advantage α2.
In Fig. 2, the key capacities of several fast-fading MIMO channels with different numbers of source,
destination, and eavesdropper antennas are plotted against the eavesdropper’s channel gain advantage α2,
with P/σ2 = 10dB. The results in Fig. 2 show the other effect of spatial dimensionality. We observe that
the key capacity decreases almost reciprocally with α2 in the channels with (mS ,mD,mW ) = (1, 1, 1)
and (mS ,mD,mW ) = (2, 2, 2), but stays almost constant for the channel with (mS ,mD,mW ) = (2, 1, 1).
It seems that the relative numbers of source and eavesdropper antennas again play the main role in
differentiating these two different behaviors of the key capacity. To verify that, we evaluate the limiting
value of CK as the gain advantage α2 of the eavesdropper becomes very large. To highlight the dependence
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of CK on α2, we use the notation CK(α2).
Corollary 3.3: limα→∞CK(α2) =
 0 if mW ≥ mSC∞(P ) if mW < mS .
Proof: Similar to the proof of Corollary 3.1.
Similar to the case of large SNR, when the number of source antennas is larger than that of the
eavesdropper’s antennas, secret information can be passed across the dimensions not observable by the
eavesdropper. This can be achieved with neither the source nor the destination knowing the channel
matrix HW .
IV. ALTERNATIVE ACHIEVABILITY OF KEY CAPACITY
In this section, we provide an alternative proof of achievability for key capacity, which does not
require the transmission of continuous symbols over the public channel. We derive the result from “first
principles”, which provides more insight on the desirable structure of a practical key agreement scheme.
The main steps of the key agreement procedure are the following:
1) the source sends a sequence of i.i.d. symbols Xn;
2) the destination “quantizes” its received sequence Y n into Yˆ n with a Wyner-Ziv compression
scheme;
3) the destination uses a binning scheme with the quantized symbol sequences to determine the secret
key and the information to feed back to the source over the public channel;
4) the source exploits the information sent by the destination to reconstruct the destination’s quantized
sequence Yˆ n and uses the same binning scheme to generate its secret key.
The secrecy of the resulting key is established by carefully structuring the binning scheme.
For the memoryless wiretap channel (X,Y, Z) specified by the joint pdf p(y|x)p(z|x)p(x), consider
the quadruple (X,Y, Yˆ , Z) defined by the joint pdf p(x, y, yˆ, z) = p(yˆ|y)p(y|x)p(z|x)p(x) with p(yˆ|y)
to be specified later. We assume that Yˆ takes values in the alphabet Y . Given a sequence of n elements
xn = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), p(xn) =
∏n
j=1 p(xj) unless otherwise specified. Similar notation and convention
apply to all other sequences as well as their corresponding pdfs and conditional pdfs considered hereafter.
A. Random Code Generation
Choose p(yˆ|y) such that I(X; Yˆ )−I(Yˆ ;Z) > 0 and I(Yˆ ;Z) > 0, and let p(yˆ) denote the corresponding
marginal. Note that the existence of such p(yˆ|y) can be assumed without loss of generality if I(X;Y )−
I(Y ;Z) > 0 and I(Y ;Z) > 0. If I(X;Y ) − I(Y ;Z) = 0, there is nothing to prove. Similarly, if
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I(Y ;Z) = 0, the construction below can be trivially modified to show that I(X;Y ) is an achievable key
rate.
Fix a small (small enough so that the various rate definitions and bounds on probabilities below make
sense and are non-trivial) ε > 0. Let us define
R1
∆= I(Y ; Yˆ ) + 4ε
R2
∆= I(Y ; Yˆ )− I(X; Yˆ ) + 22ε
R3
∆= I(X; Yˆ )− I(Yˆ ;Z)− ε
R4
∆= I(Yˆ ;Z)− 17ε. (27)
For each j = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR2 and l = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR3 , generate 2nR4 codewords
Yˆ n(j, l, 1), Yˆ n(j, l, 2), . . . , Yˆ n(j, l, 2nR4) according to p(yˆn). The set of codewords {Yˆ n(j, l, k)} with
k = 1 . . . 2nR4 forms a subcode denoted by C(j, l). The union of all subcodes C(j, l) for j = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR2
and l = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR3 forms the code C. For convenience, we denote the 2nR1 codewords in C as
Yˆ n(1), Yˆ n(2), . . . , Yˆ n(2nR1), where Yˆ n(j + (l − 1)2nR2 + (w − 1)2n(R2+R3)) = Yˆ n(j, l, w) for
j = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR2 , l = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR3 , and w = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR4 . The code C and its subcodes C(j, l) is
revealed to the source, destination, and eavesdropper. In the following, we refer to a codeword or its
index in C interchangeably. Under this convention, the subcode C(j, l) is also the set that contains all
the indices of its codewords. Denote Cˆ(j) = ⋃2nR3l=1 C(j, l) and C˜(l) = ⋃2nR2j=1 C(j, l).
B. Secret Sharing Procedure
For convenience, we define the joint typicality indicator function Tε(·) that takes in a number of
sequences as its arguments. The value of Tε(·) is 1 if the sequences are ε-jointly typical, and the value
is 0 otherwise. Further define the indicator function for the sequence pair (yn, yˆn):
Sε(yn, yˆn) =
 1 if Pr{Tε(Xn, yn, yˆn, Zn) = 1} ≥ 1− ε0 otherwise
where (Xn, Zn) is distributed according to p(xn, zn|yn, yˆn) in the definition above.
The source generates a random sequence Xn distributed according to p(xn). If Xn satisfies the average
power constraint (1), the source sends Xn through the (X,Y, Z) channel. Otherwise, it ends the secret-
sharing process. Since p(x) satisfies E[|X|2] ≤ P , the law of large numbers implies that the probability
of the latter event can be made arbitrarily small by increasing n. Hence we can assume below, with no
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loss of generality, that Xn satisfies (1) and is sent by the source. This assumption helps to make the
probability calculations in Section IV-C less tedious.
Upon reception of the sequence Y n, the destination tries to quantize the received sequence. Let M
be the output of its quantizer. Specifically, if there is a unique sequence Yˆ n(m) ∈ C for some m ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 2nR1} such that Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m)) = 1, then it sets the output of the quantizer to M = m. If
there is more than one such sequence, M is set to be the smallest sequence index m. If there is no such
sequence, it sets M = 0. Let L and J be the unique indices such that Yˆ n(M) ∈ C(J, L). The index L
will be used as the key while the index J is fed back to the source over the public channel, i.e. Ψk = J .
If M = 0, set J = 0 and choose L randomly over {1, 2, . . . , 2nR3} with uniform probabilities.
After receiving the feedback information J via the public channel, the source attempts to find a unique
Yˆ n(m) ∈ C such that Tε(Xn, Yˆ n(m)) = 1 and m ∈ Cˆ(J). If there is such a unique Yˆ n(m), the source
decodes Mˆ = m. If there is no such sequence or more than one such sequence, the source sets Mˆ = 0.
If J = 0, it sets Mˆ = 0. Finally, if Mˆ > 0, the source generates its key K = k, such that Mˆ ∈ C(J, k).
If Mˆ = 0, it sets K = 0.
We also consider a fictitious receiver who observes the sequence Zn and obtains both indices J and
L via the public channel. This receiver sets M˜ = 0 if J = 0. Otherwise, it attempts to find a unique
Yˆ n(m) ∈ C such that Tε(Yˆ n(m), Zn) = 1 and m ∈ C(J, L). If there is such a unique Yˆ n(m), the source
decodes M˜ = m. If there is no such sequence or more than one such sequence, the source sets M˜ = 0.
C. Analysis of Probability of Error
We use a random coding argument to establish the existence of a code with rates given by (27) such that
Pr{K 6= L} and Pr{M 6= M˜} vanish in the limit of large block length n. Without further clarification,
we note that the probabilities of the events below, except otherwise stated, are over the joint distribution
of the codebook C, codewords, and all other random quantities involved.
Before we proceed, we introduce the following lemma regarding the indicator function Sε.
Lemma 4.1: 1) If (Y n, Yˆ n) distributes according to p(yn, yˆn), then Pr{Sε(Y n, Yˆ n) = 1} > 1− ε
for sufficiently large n.
2) If Yˆ n distributes according to p(yˆn), then Pr{Sε(yn, Yˆ n) = 1} ≤ 2−n(R1−7ε)1−ε for all yn.
3) If Y n distributes according to p(yn), then Pr{Sε(Y n, yˆn) = 1} ≤ 2−n(R1−7ε)1−ε for all yˆn.
4) If (Y n, Yˆ n) distributes according to p(yn)p(yˆn), then Pr{Sε(Y n, Yˆ n) = 1} > (1− ε) · 2−n(R1−ε)
for sufficiently large n.
Proof:
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1) This claim is actually shown in [36]. We briefly sketch the proof here using our notation for
completeness and easy reference. By the reverse Markov inequality [36],
Pr{Sε(Y n, Yˆ n) = 1} ≥ 1− 1− Pr{Tε(X
n, Y n, Yˆ n, Zn) = 1}
1− (1− ε) > 1− ε
where the second inequality is due to that fact that Pr{Tε(Xn, Y n, Yˆ n, Zn) = 1} > 1 − ε2 for
sufficiently large n.
2) First, we only need to consider typical yn since the bound is trivial when yn is not typical. Notice
that for any such yn,
1 ≥
∫
Tε(xn, yn, yˆn, zn)p(xn, yˆn, zn|yn)dxndzndyˆn
=
∫
Pr{Tε(Xn, yn, yˆn, Zn) = 1} · p(y
n, yˆn)
p(yn)
dyˆn
≥
∫
Pr{Tε(Xn, yn, yˆn, Zn) = 1} · 2
−n(h(Y,Yˆ )+ε)
2−n(h(Y )−ε)
dyˆn
= 2−n(h(Yˆ |Y )+2ε)
∫
Pr{Tε(Xn, yn, yˆn, Zn) = 1}dyˆn.
Hence
2n(h(Yˆ |Y )+2ε) ≥
∫
Pr{Tε(Xn, yn, yˆn, Zn) = 1}dyˆn
≥
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn) · Pr{Tε(Xn, yn, yˆn, Zn) = 1}dyˆn
≥ (1− ε)
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn)dyˆn. (28)
Now
Pr{Sε(yn, Yˆ n) = 1} =
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn)p(yˆn)dyˆn
≤
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn)2−n(h(Yˆ )−ε)dyˆn
≤ 2
−n(I(Y ;Yˆ )−3ε)
1− ε ,
where the last inequality is due to (28).
3) Same as Part 2), interchanging the roles of yn and yˆn.
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4) From Part 1), we get
1− ε <
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn)p(yn, yˆn)dyndyˆn
=
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn)
p(yn, yˆn)
p(yn)p(yˆn)
p(yn)p(yˆn)dyndyˆn
≤
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn) · 2
−n(h(Y,Yˆ )−ε)
2−n(h(Y )+ε) · 2−n(h(Yˆ )+ε)
· p(yn)p(yˆn)dyndyˆn
= 2n(I(Y ;Yˆ )−3ε) Pr{Sε(Y n, Yˆ n) = 1}.
Moreover we need to bound the probabilities of the following events pertaining to M .
Lemma 4.2: 1) Pr{M = 0} < 2ε for sufficiently large n.
2) For m = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR1 , Pr{M = m} ≤ 2−n(R1−7ε)1−ε .
3) When n is sufficiently large, Pr{M = m} ≥
[
1− 2−n(R1−7ε)1−ε
]m−1 · (1− ε)2−n(R1−ε) uniformly for
all m = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR1 .
4) When n is sufficiently large, Pr{J = j, L = l} > (1 − ε)4 · 2−n(R1−R4+6ε) uniformly for all
j = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR2 and l = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR3 .
Proof:
1) We will use an argument similar to the one in the achievability proof of rate distortion function
in [27, Section 10.5] to bound Pr{M = 0}. First note that {M = 0} is the event that
Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m)) = 0 for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , R1}, and hence
Pr{M = 0} = Pr

2nR1⋂
m=1
{Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m)) = 0}

=
∫ [
Pr{Sε(yn, Yˆ n(1)) = 0}
]2nR1
p(yn)dyn, (29)
where the second equality is due to the fact that Yˆ n(1), . . . , Yˆ n(2nR1) are i.i.d. given each fixed yn.
24
But[
Pr{Sε(yn, Yˆ n(1)) = 0}
]2nR1
=
[
1−
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn)p(yˆn)dyˆn
]2nR1
=
[
1−
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn)p(yˆn|yn)p(y
n)p(yˆn)
p(yn, yˆn)
dyˆn
]2nR1
≤
[
1−
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn)p(yˆn|yn)2
−n(h(Y )+ε) · 2−n(h(Yˆ )+ε)
2−n(h(Y,Yˆ )−ε)
dyˆn
]2nR1
=
[
1− 2−n(I(Y ;Yˆ )+3ε)
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn)p(yˆn|yn)dyˆn
]2nR1
≤ 1−
∫
Sε(yn, yˆn)p(yˆn|yn)dyˆn + exp (−2nε) , (30)
where the inequality on the third line is due to the fact that Sε(yn, yˆn) = 1 implies Tε(yn, yˆn) = 1,
and the last line results from the inequality (1 − xy)k ≤ 1 − x + e−ky for all 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1
and positive integer k [27, Lemma 10.5.3]. Substituting (30) back into (29) and using Lemma 4.1
Part 1), we get
Pr{M = 0} ≤ 1− Pr{Sε(Y n, Yˆ n) = 1}+ exp (−2nε) < ε+ ε = 2ε
for sufficiently large n.
2) Notice that for m = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR1 ,
Pr{M = m} = Pr{Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m)) = 1, Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m− 1)) = 0, . . . , Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(1)) = 0}
=
∫
Pr{Sε(yn, Yˆ n(1)) = 1}
[
Pr{Sε(yn, Yˆ n(1)) = 0}
]m−1
p(yn)dyn (31)
where the second equality results from the i.i.d. nature of Yˆ n(1), . . . , Yˆ n(m). Thus we have
Pr{M = m} ≤ Pr{Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(1)) = 1} ≤ 2
−n(R1−7ε)
1− ε ,
where the last inequality is due to Part 2) of Lemma 4.1 since Y n and Yˆ n(1) are independent.
3) From (31), we have the lower bound
Pr{M = m} ≥
[
1− 2
−n(R1−7ε)
1− ε
]m−1
Pr{Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(1)) = 1}
≥
[
1− 2
−n(R1−7ε)
1− ε
]m−1
· (1− ε)2−n(R1−ε)
where the first inequality is due to Part 2) of Lemma 4.1, and the second inequality is from Part 4)
of Lemma 4.1 when n is sufficiently large. Note that the same sufficiently large n is enough to
guarantee the validity of the lower bound above for all m = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR1 .
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4) First note that, for j = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR2 and l = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR3 ,
Pr{J = j, L = l} =
∑
m∈C(j,l)
Pr{M = m} =
2nR4∑
w=1
Pr
{
M = j + (l − 1)2nR2 + (w − 1)2n(R2+R3)
}
.
Thus applying Part 3) of the lemma, we get
Pr{J = j, L = l}
≥ (1− ε)2−n(R1−ε) ·
2nR4∑
w=1
[
1− 2
−n(R1−7ε)
1− ε
]j−1+(l−1)2nR2+(w−1)2n(R2+R3)
≥ (1− ε)2−n(R1−ε)
[
1− 2
−n(R1−7ε)
1− ε
]2n(R2+R3)
1− [1− 2−n(R1−7ε)/(1− ε)]2nR1
1− [1− 2−n(R1−7ε)/(1− ε)]2n(R2+R3)
≥ (1− ε)2−n(R1−ε)
[
1− 2
−n(R4−7ε)
1− ε
]
· 1−
[
1− 2−n(R1−7ε)/(1− ε)]2nR1
1− [1− 2−n(R4−7ε)/(1− ε)]
≥ (1− ε)2 · 2−n(R1−R4+6ε)
[
1− 2
−n(R4−7ε)
1− ε
] [
1− exp(−2
7nε)
1− ε
]
> (1− ε)4 · 2−n(R1−R4+6ε) (32)
uniformly for all j = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR2 and l = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR3 , when n is sufficiently large. The lower
bound on the fourth line of (32) above is obtained from the inequality (1 − x)k ≥ 1 − kx for
any 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and positive integer k. The lower bound on the fifth line is in turn based on the
inequality (1− x)k ≤ e−kx for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and positive integer k.
We first consider the error event {K 6= L}. Note that
Pr{K 6= L} = Pr{M = 0}+ Pr{M > 0,K 6= L}
= Pr{M = 0}+
2nR1∑
m=1
Pr
{
E˜m ∪ Em,M = m
}
≤ Pr{M = 0}+
2nR1∑
m=1
Pr
{
E˜m,M = m
}
+
2nR1∑
m=1
Pr {Em,M = m} (33)
where E˜m is the event {Tε(Xn, Yˆ n(m)) = 0}, and Em is the event that there is an m′ ∈ Cˆ(j) such that
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m ∈ Cˆ(j), m′ 6= m, and Tε(Xn, Yˆ n(m′)) = 1. From (31), we have
Pr
{
E˜m,M = m
}
= Pr
{
Tε(Xn, Yˆ n(m)) = 0, Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m)) = 1, Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m− 1)) = 0, . . . , Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(1)) = 0
}
≤ Pr
{
Tε(Xn, Y n, Yˆ n(m), Zn) = 0, Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m)) = 1,
Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m− 1)) = 0, . . . , Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(1)) = 0
}
=
∫ [∫
Pr
{
Tε(xn, yn, Yˆ n(m), zn) = 0, Sε(yn, Yˆ n(m)) = 1
}
p(xn, zn|yn)dxndzn
]
·
m−1∏
m′=1
Pr{Sε(yn, Yˆ n(m′)) = 0}p(yn)dyn
=
∫ ({∫
[1− Tε(xn, yn, yˆn, zn)]p(xn, zn|yn, yˆn)dxndzn
}
· Sε(yn, yˆn)p(yˆn)dyˆn
)
·
m−1∏
m′=1
Pr{Sε(yn, Yˆ n(m′)) = 0}p(yn)dyn
≤ ε · Pr
{
Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m)) = 1, Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m− 1)) = 0, . . . , Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(1)) = 0
}
= ε · Pr{M = m}, (34)
where the equality on the fourth line is due to the i.i.d. nature of Yˆ n(1), . . . , Yˆ n(2nR1), the equality on
the fifth line results from the fact that p(xn, zn|yn) = p(xn, zn|yn, yˆn) (since (X,Z) → Y → Yˆ ), and
the inequality on the second last line is from the definition of the indicator function Sε.
Similarly assuming m ∈ Cˆ(j), we have from (31)
Pr{Em,M = m} ≤
∑
m′ ∈ Cˆ(j)
m′ 6= m
Pr
{
Tε(Xn, Yˆ n(m′)) = 1, Sε(Y n, Yˆ n(m)) = 1
}
=
∑
m′ ∈ Cˆ(j)
m′ 6= m
∫
Pr{Tε(xn, Yˆ n(m′)) = 1} · Pr{Sε(yn, Yˆ n(m)) = 1}p(xn, yn)dxndyn
≤ 2n(R1−R2) · 2−n(I(X;Yˆ )−3ε) · 2
−n(R1−7ε)
1− ε =
2−n(R1+8ε)
1− ε , (35)
where the equality on the second line is due to the independence between Yˆ n(m′) and Yˆ n(m), and the last
inequality results from Part 2) of Lemma 4.1 and the bound Pr{Tε(xn, Yˆ n(m′)) = 1} ≤ 2−n(I(X;Yˆ )−3ε),
which is a direct result of [27, Theorem 15.2.2]. Hence, substituting the bounds in (34) and (35) back
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into (33) and using Part 1) of Lemma 4.2, we obtain
Pr{K 6= L} ≤ 2ε+ ε ·
2nR1∑
m=1
Pr{M = m}+
2nR1∑
m=1
2−n(R1+8ε)
1− ε = 2ε+ ε+
2−8nε
1− ε < 4ε (36)
for n is sufficiently large.
Next we consider the event {M 6= M˜}. Define F˜m as the event {Tε(Yˆ n(m), Zn) = 0} and Fm as
the event that there is an m′ ∈ C(l, j) such that m ∈ C(l, j), m′ 6= m, and Tε(Yˆ n(m′), Zn) = 1. Then
we have, when n is sufficiently large, uniformly for all j = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR2 and l = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR3 ,
Pr{M˜ 6= M |J = j, L = l}
≤
∑
m∈C(j,l)
Pr
{
F˜m,M = m|J = j, L = l
}
+
∑
m∈C(j,l)
Pr {Fm,M = m|J = j, L = l}
≤
∑
m∈C(j,l)
ε · Pr{M = m|J = j, L = l}+
∑
m∈C(j,l)
2−n(R1+7ε)
1− ε ·
1
Pr{J = j, L = l}
≤ ε+ 2
−n(R1+7ε)
1− ε ·
2nR4
(1− ε)4 · 2−n(R1−R4+6ε)
= ε+
2−nε
(1− ε)5 < 2ε. (37)
Note that the inequality on the third line of (37) results from upper bounds of Pr{F˜m,M = m} and
Pr{Fm,M = m}, which can be obtained in ways almost identical to the derivations in (34) and (35)
respectively. The inequality on the fourth line is, on the other hand, due to Part 4) of Lemma 4.2.
By expurgating the random code ensemble, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3: For any  > 0 and n sufficiently large, there exists a code Cn with the rates R1, R2, R3,
and R4 given by (27) such that
1) Pr{K 6= L|C = Cn} < 8ε,
2) Pr{M 6= M˜ |C = Cn} < 8ε,
3) Pr{M = m|C = Cn} ≤ 2−n(R1−7ε)1−ε for all m = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR1 , and
4) Pr{L = l|C = Cn} < 2−n(R3−8ε) for all l = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR3 .
Proof: Combining Part 1) of Lemma 4.2, (36), and (37), we have
Pr{M = 0}+ Pr{K 6= L}+ Pr{M 6= M˜} < 8ε
for sufficiently large n. This implies that there must exist a Cn satisfying Pr{K 6= L|C = Cn} < 8ε,
Pr{M 6= M˜ |C = Cn} < 8ε, and Pr{M = 0|C = Cn} < 8ε. Thus, Parts 1) and 2) are proved.
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Now, fix this Cn. For m = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR1 , let yˆn(m) be the mth codeword of Cn. Then, by Part 3) of
Lemma 4.1,
Pr{M = m|C = Cn} ≤ Pr{Sε(Y n, yˆn(m)) = 1} ≤ 2
−n(R1−7ε)
1− ε ;
hence, Part 3) results.
Note that, for l = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR3 ,
Pr{L = l|C = Cn} = Pr{L = l|M = 0, C = Cn}Pr{M = 0|C = Cn}+ Pr{L = l,M > 0|C = Cn}.
(38)
We know from the discussion above that Pr{L = l|M = 0, C = Cn}Pr{M = 0|C = Cn} < 2−nR3 · 8ε.
Also from Part 3) of the lemma,
Pr{L = l,M > 0|C = Cn} =
∑
m∈C˜n(l)
Pr{M = m|C = Cn} ≤ 2n(R1−R3) · 2
−n(R1−7ε)
1− ε =
2−n(R3−7ε)
1− ε .
Putting these back into (38), we get
Pr{L = l|C = Cn} < 2−n(R3−7ε)
[
8ε · 2−7nε + 1
1− ε
]
< 2−n(R3−8ε)
for sufficiently large n. Thus, Part 4) is proved.
In the remainder of the paper, we use a fixed code Cn identified by Lemma 4.3. For convenience, we
drop the conditioning on Cn.
D. Secrecy Analysis
First we proceed to bound H(K). Note that
H(K) = H(L) +H(K|L)−H(L|K)
≥ H(L)−H(L|K). (39)
Using Part 1) of Lemma 4.3 together with Fano’s inequality gives H(L|K) ≤ 1 + 8nεR3. Moreover
Part 4) of Lemma 4.3 implies that H(L) > n(R3 − 8ε). Putting these bounds back into (39), we have
R3 − (8R3 + 8)ε− 1
n
<
1
n
H(K) ≤ R3. (40)
Next we bound I(K;Zn, J). Note that
I(K;Zn, J) = I(L;Zn, J) + I(K;Zn, J |L)− I(L;Zn, J |K)
≤ I(L;Zn, J) + I(K;Zn, J |L)
≤ I(L;Zn, J) +H(K|L)
≤ I(L;Zn, J) + 8nεR3 + 1 (41)
29
where the last inequality is obtained from Part 1) of Lemma 4.3 and Fano’s inequality like before. In
addition, it holds that
I(L;Zn, J) = H(L)−H(L|Zn, J)
= H(L)−H(L, J |Zn) +H(J |Zn)
= H(L) +H(J |Zn)−H(L, J,M |Zn) +H(M |Zn, L, J)
≤ H(L) +H(J)−H(M |Zn)−H(L, J |M,Zn) +H(M |Zn, L, J)
≤ H(L) +H(J) + I(M ;Zn)−H(M) + 8nR1ε+ 1,
where the second last inequality follows from H(J |Zn) ≤ H(J), and the last inequality follows from
H(L, J |M,Zn) = 0 (by definition of J and L) and H(M |Zn, L, J) ≤ 1 + 8nR1ε (by Fano’s inequality
applied to the fictitious receiver). By construction of the code Cn, it holds that H(L) ≤ nR2 and
H(J) ≤ nR3. In addition, Part 3) of Lemma 4.3 implies H(M) ≥ n(R1 − 8ε). Finally, note that
I(M ;Zn) ≤ I(Y n;Zn) = nI(Y ;Z) by the data-processing inequality applied to the Markov chain
Yˆ n → Y n → Zn and the memoryless property of the channel between Y n and Zn. Combining these
observations and substituting the values of R1, R2, and R3 given by (27) back into (41), we obtain
1
n
I(K;Zn, J) ≤ R2 +R3 −R1 + I(Y ;Z) + (8R1 + 8R3 + 8)ε+ 2
n
≤ I(Y ;Z)− I(Yˆ ;Z) + (8R1 + 8R3 + 9)ε,
when n is sufficiently large. Without any rate limitation on the public channel, we can choose the transition
probability p(yˆ|y) such that I(Y ;Z)− I(Yˆ ;Z) ≤ ε; therefore,
1
n
I(K;Zn, J) ≤ (8R1 + 8R3 + 9)ε. (42)
Since ε > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily, Part 1) of Lemma 4.3, (40), and (42), establish the achievability
of the secret key rate I(Y ;X)− I(Y ;Z).
V. CONCLUSION
We evaluated the key capacity of the fast-fading MIMO wiretap channel. We found that spatial
dimensionality provided by the use of multiple antennas at the source and destination can be employed
to combat a channel-gain advantage of the eavesdropper over the destination. In particular if the source
has more antennas than the eavesdropper, then the channel gain advantage of the eavesdropper can be
completely overcome in the sense that the key capacity does not vanish when the eavesdropper channel
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gain advantage becomes asymptotically large. This is the most interesting observation of this paper, as
no eavesdropper CSI is needed at the source or destination to achieve the non-vanishing key capacity.
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